Soft power, global governance of cultural industries and rising powers: the case of China by Vlassis, Antonios
This article was downloaded by: [Antonios Vlassis]
On: 28 January 2015, At: 15:22
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Click for updates
International Journal of Cultural Policy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gcul20
Soft power, global governance of
cultural industries and rising powers:
the case of China
Antonios Vlassisa
a Center for International Relations Studies (CEFIR), Department
of Political Science, University of Liège, Fonds national de
Recherche Scientifique (FNRS), Liège, Belgium
Published online: 26 Jan 2015.
To cite this article: Antonios Vlassis (2015): Soft power, global governance of cultural
industries and rising powers: the case of China, International Journal of Cultural Policy, DOI:
10.1080/10286632.2014.1002487
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2014.1002487
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &


























Soft power, global governance of cultural industries and rising
powers: the case of China
Antonios Vlassis*
Center for International Relations Studies (CEFIR), Department of Political Science,
University of Liège, Fonds national de Recherche Scientiﬁque (FNRS), Liège, Belgium
(Received 1 August 2014; accepted 22 December 2014)
This article addresses the importance of cultural industries for the strengthening
of the soft power of the rising powers and it seeks to understand how the cul-
tural industries allow rising powers to shape the structures of their international
environment. More speciﬁcally, studying the cases of People’s Republic of
China and of the movie industry, my article focuses on the current evolution of
the relationship between the Chinese authorities and the ﬁlm industry, as well
as on the development of the domestic ﬁlm market. I further aim to draw up an
inventory of China’s role within the global governance of cultural industries.
Finally, I aim to highlight the global cultural competition that China faces,
emphasizing the practices of the US administration and Hollywood. I argue that
even if China is the current centre of gravity within the world economy, it still
has a long way to go in order to shape the distribution of resources within the
global governance of cultural industries and to play a crucial role in the
international battle of cultural symbols.
Keywords: China; soft power; global governance; cultural industries; US
administration and Hollywood
The cultural industries, oscillated between symbolic and material spheres, raise
important issues for many involved actors: economic issues because cultural indus-
tries are a key sector in terms of growth and employment for the national econo-
mies1; political issues, given that cultural industries – seen as vehicles of values
and collective representations – are resources of the power of States and of their
capacity to shape their international environment; ﬁnally, identity issues because
cultural expressions – distributed by cultural industries – are usually components of
a national, regional or local identity and many actors are increasingly worried on
cultural dominance.
In October 2011, the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
underlined the need for strengthening the Chinese soft power ‘with a view to the
overall prosperity of cultural undertakings and sound development of cultural
industries’ and for holding ‘fast to the approach of multi-level, extensive interna-
tional cultural exchanges and continuously improve the international inﬂuence of
Chinese culture’ (Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China 2013,
p. 3). Since the end of the Cold War, the rise of China on the world stage has been
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one of the most important historical and political phenomena. Its impressive
economic growth, its social transformations and its inﬂuence on the international
affairs force many scholars to question the status of China in the international
arena. Is China a rising power that moves on from regional power to global power?
Is the desire of the Chinese authorities to challenge the US predominance and to
access to the world hegemony? (Johnston 2003, Gipouloux 2006, Cabestan 2010,
Shambaugh 2013).
On the one hand, recent studies focus on the foreign cultural action of
China and its soft power in order to offer useful insights on these tricky questions
(Cheow and Chu 2004, Cho and Jeong 2008, Mingjiang 2009, Barr 2010, Wang
2011, Lai and Lulu 2012, Swielande 2012). In their deﬁnition on the soft power,
they include various areas such as trade, language, values in the broadest sense,
religion and education. However, the cultural industries, and especially ﬁlm indus-
try, are still an unknown factor for highlighting the role that China can and will
play on the global stage. Furthermore, it would point out that the analysis on
immaterial resources of power came particularly to dominate the discipline of Inter-
national Relations (IR) during the 1980s debate on the possible decline of US hege-
mony (Battistella 2013, p. 239). As such, in 1990, Joseph Nye (1990, 2004)
developed the concept of soft power in order to highlight the transformations of the
components of the State power in the current international relations. As the promi-
nent American scholar put it, if the United States wishes to be the hegemonic
power of the 21th century, it would need to strengthen its soft power, based on
intangible resources.2 In addition, during the 1980s, Susan Strange elaborated the
concept of structural power in order to focus on the tangible and intangible capabil-
ities of the United States to determine the international structures and to provide
the leadership on the global scale (Strange 1994). While the two scholars identiﬁed
multiple variables to understand the transformation of power in the era of globaliza-
tion, the cultural industries were not adequately addressed in their studies. However,
the approach of Susan Strange recently inspired analyses (Scott 2004, Laroche and
Bohas 2005, Bohas 2010) on cultural capitalism of the United States and on its main
vectors, such as the multinational entertainment corporations (Hollywood).
On the other hand, while there is a lively academic debate in IR about the con-
ﬁguration of actors and of norms within the global governance of a large number
of sectors such as environment, energy, labour, or health, relatively little has been
said about the international dimension of governance of cultural industries (Singh
2010, Vlassis 2013, 2014a, 2015, Kozymka 2014). Thus, the action and the politi-
cal inﬂuence of China in this context are absent from the IR literature. More specif-
ically, by global governance of cultural industries, I mean a system for organizing
the relations of power and of regulation at the world level (Stocker 1998, Cabrera
2011); it is composed of rules, norms and institutions, affecting several aspects of
cultural goods and services (creation, production, distribution, exhibition, etc.) and
allowing the involved actors to coordinate their practices in a context of disaggre-
gated sovereignty (Slaughter 2004), of polyarchic authority (Avant et al. 2010) and
of absence of global government (Rosenau 1997). The global governance of cul-
tural industries is not so much a harmonious and static approach for the today’s
international cultural relations, but rather a continuous process within which a
constant game of bargaining, exchanges and political battles is made (Smouts 1998,


























Collective art, mass art, art of modernity, major industrial art of the contempo-
rary ‘screenocracy’,3 the cinema is ‘a tool of soft power of nations’ (Dagnaud
2011) and the most signiﬁcant cultural industry in terms of economic proﬁtability
and symbolic inﬂuence.4 Even if the cultural external action of a country seeks
various and long term objectives that are very difﬁcult to assess their impact
(Gilboa 2008, Morin 2013, p. 41), it is worth addressing not only the role of
Chinese ﬁlm industry for strengthening the Chinese soft power, but also how this
cultural industry allows China to build an active status of world power (Santander
2013, p. 524). In this view, I seek in this article to analyse the evolution of the
relationship between the Chinese authorities and the ﬁlm industry, as well as the
development of the domestic ﬁlm market. I further aim to draw up an inventory of
China’s role within the global governance of cultural industries and its international
commitments in this area (General Agreements on Trade in Services-World Trade
Organization, 2005 Convention on Diversity of Cultural Expressions-UNESCO).
Finally, I aim to address the global cultural competition that China faces, focusing
especially on the practices of the US administration and Hollywood.
China: a major cinema power?
Since the end of the Cold War, the development of the ‘electric shadows’ industry5
has become a priority for the Chinese authorities. The China’s State Administration
of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and the powerful China Film Group man-
age in a dense and monopolistic way all the components of Chinese movie industry
– production, importation, distribution and exhibition – and heavily taxes foreign
audiovisual products. The transformation of the Chinese ﬁlm economy has begun
since the 1990s, when the country decided to integrate into the multilateral eco-
nomic system. In the late of 1980s, the Chinese ﬁlm industry went through a pro-
found crisis: signiﬁcant reduction in the cinema attendance and dramatic decrease
in the ﬁlm production (Zhu and Nakajima 2010, pp. 17–33). Chinese authorities
then undertook a slow opening of the ﬁlm market because of the risk of its collapse
and of the pressure from the Clinton administration and Hollywood studios in their
ambition to open new ﬁlm markets (Mingant 2010, pp. 49–50). In 1994, SARFT
agreed to give a percentage of revenue for ten foreign ﬁlms per year (revenue-shar-
ing ﬁlms) and to keep buying the other movies in a ﬁxed price (ﬂat-fee ﬁlms) and
selecting the imported movies. Despite these barriers to trade, since 1996, the for-
eign ﬁlms, and especially Hollywood movies, have captured a 40–50% stake in the
Chinese market (OEA 1998–2013), showing that the Chinese audience is very
receptive to Hollywood pictures unlike other Asian countries such as India.6 Simul-
taneously, China has developed a ﬁlm d’auteur inserted into the international art
circuits and receiving many awards in the ﬁve major international ﬁlm festivals
(Cannes, Venice, Berlin, San Sebastian and Locarno): without a signiﬁcant award
up until the late 1980s, Chinese ﬁlms won 19 awards between 1988 and 2014.7
Since its WTO accession in 2001, China has been committed to increase the
number of imported ﬁlms: the annual quota of foreign ﬁlms distributed in
revenue-sharing has increased from 10 to 20 (Augros and Kitsopanidou 2009,
pp. 226–227). Nevertheless, in 2009, following a complaint lodged by the US
administration in 2007,8 the WTO condemned China for its trade practices within
the cultural sector – books, movies, music – and especially for its strict regulatory
measures imposed to the US exporters and distributors of many audiovisual

























products. Since then, China has sought to soften its quotas system allowing access
to a greater number of foreign revenue-sharing ﬁlms within its cinema market.9 As
a result, in February 2012, US and China signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding
on WTO Related Problems in the Film Industry’ and US Vice President Joe Biden
announced that China allowed the importation of 14 more Hollywood movies and
increased the percentage of sharing-revenues to the foreign operators from 13 to
25% (Vlassis 2012).10 It is obvious that the relations between China and Holly-
wood are becoming closer, from a mistrust vis-à-vis movies-symbols of American
capitalism and of Westernization to a more intense cooperation and to a slow but
constant opening of the Chinese ﬁlm market to the Hollywood products. In this
sense, this partnership has become strategic for the future development not only of
the Chinese ﬁlm industry, but also of Hollywood (Jihong and Kraus 2002).
During the last decade, the priorities of Chinese policy-makers focus on the impres-
sive domestic expansion of the Chinese ﬁlm industry and on the encouragement of the
private investment as a result of the substantial proﬁt margins of the ﬁlm industry (Zhu
2003, pp. 142–160). The ﬁlm market in China has been characterized by impressive
growth, four or ﬁve times higher than the growth of China’s GDP. In 2004, total ﬁlm
market revenues represent US$ 435 million. By contrast, in 2013, China was the
world’s second largest ﬁlm market and generated US$ 3.6 billion in box-ofﬁce revenue
(Table 1). If this trend continues, China will overtake the North-American (US-Canada)
market and become the world’s ﬁrst ﬁlm market by 2020 (UNESCO Institute for Statis-
tics 2013, p. 25). In addition, in 2008, the number of screens was 4.097, while in 2012,
this number tripled, reaching 13.118 screens. Finally, in 2012, the Chinese ﬁlm produc-
tion reached 745 movies (only 82 movies in 1998).
It’s worth mentioning that in September 2013, Wang Jianlin, CEO of the
Chinese conglomerate company Wanda – with activities in real estate, tourism and
entertainment – announced its plans to build the world’s biggest ﬁlm studio in the
east coast of China. It is one of the most massive investments in the ﬁlm industry
history, reaching US$ 8.2 billion. In parallel, in 2012, Wanda Group agreed to buy
AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc. (AMC) for US$ 2.6 billion, expanding into the
US to create the world’s biggest cinema owner. The deal marked the largest-ever
buyout of a US company by a Chinese ﬁrm. The AMC Theatres, founded in 1920,
has the second-largest share of the US market, behind Regal Entertainment Group.
It reveals that China’s objective for boosting its cultural power is not only part of
the Chinese authorities, but also of industrial companies: in this regard, Wang
Jianlin said that ‘in ten years, the Chinese economy will be on way to dethrone US
as dominant economic power. But in terms of cultural power, China is still far
behind (…) this project is an opportunity to implement a national policy in order to
promote cultural power’.11
Table 1. Total box-ofﬁce revenue in ﬁve movie markets, 2008–2013 (in US$ billion).
Countries/Year 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
China 0.6 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.6
Russia 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4
India 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5
Japan 1.8 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.4



























China within the international arenas: between modest integration and
increasing presence
Institutional multilateralism occupies a key position in the political strategies of
China in order to gain a worthy and outstanding presence within the international
cultural affairs. While the normative constraints of the WTO have a clear impact
on the structure of the Chinese ﬁlm industry and they challenge governmental con-
trol over cinema industry (as we have noted above), China also seeks to preserve
its cultural sovereignty and to play a greater role in the two major issues of the glo-
bal governance on cultural industries, namely the international recognition of the
importance of cultural policies and the international promotion of the cultural
development.
China was one of the key-players in the political construction of the Convention
on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CDCE), adopted by UNESCO in 2005
and dedicated to recognize the speciﬁcity of cultural goods and services on the
international scale and to legitimize the right of governments to adopt policies
within the cultural industries sector (Aylett 2010, Vlassis 2011). A year before the
adoption, the Chinese authorities organized the seventh ministerial meeting of the
International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP),12 held from 14 to 16 October
2004 in Shanghai and attended by Ministers of Culture from 31 countries, by 18
observer countries and by six international organizations. Furthermore, during the
negotiations on the CDCE, China supported on the one hand the explicit recogni-
tion of the sovereign right of States to implement cultural policies and on the other
hand the establishment of an effective Convention vis-à-vis the international regime
of the WTO (Vlassis and Richieri-Hanania 2014). In this sense, during the debate
on Article 19 of the CDCE draft dealing with the links between the Convention
and other international agreements, the Chinese delegation favoured the option A,
which provided a non-subordination of the CDCE with trade agreements. China
therefore opted for a Convention, which has a legitimate status within the interna-
tional law, noting in its comments that ‘the Convention should become a reference
for the WTO and other international bodies. In this regard, all the international
regimes would function as a whole (UNESCO 2004, p. 87)’.
China ratiﬁed the CDCE in 2007 and it remains one of the most active coun-
tries about its implementation. Up till now, its contribution to the International
Fund for the Cultural Diversity dedicated to support cultural industries in the devel-
oping countries amounts US$ 310.000, far more than the contribution of India,
Germany, Denmark, South Africa, or of Australia, but less than the contribution of
Norway (US$ 1.45 million), France (US$ 1.42 million), or of Finland (US$ 538
450).
Note that during the meetings of the panel established by the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) of the WTO in November 2007 on trade practices of China in the cul-
tural ﬁeld (as we have seen above), the latter pointed out that its measures are
linked to many exceptions (Neuwirth 2010). In its ﬁrst written submission, China
made explicit reference to the CDCE in order to emphasize that cultural goods and
services are different from other products and in this view, the WTO members
should provide greater leeway to regulate this type of goods and services (WTO
2009, p. 107). In addition, the Chinese delegation noted that the speciﬁcity of cul-
tural goods and services is recognized by the CDCE, requesting that the DSB
should be aware of the speciﬁc nature of cultural goods (WTO 2009, p. 15).

























Instead, the members of the panel argued that the reference to the CDCE does not
corroborate the China’s position, insofar as the CDCE should not be used as a legal
instrument in order to legitimize any violations to the WTO Agreements.
China seeks recently to play an increasing role in international cultural arena to
advance its political agenda. In May 2013, in collaboration with UNESCO, it orga-
nized the Hangzhou International Congress on ‘Culture: key to sustainable develop-
ment’, revealing that the Chinese ambitions are no longer limited to its regional
area. ‘For the UNESCO, it was better that a rising country organises this Congress.
We discussed with the Chinese authorities because they were, in principle, in
favour and they wanted to organise a big event’.13 This Congress has been the ﬁrst
International Congress on the links between culture and development organized
since the Stockholm Conference in 1998. The latter has led to the adoption of
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2001 and then to the
CDCE in 2005. In Hangzhou, around 400 experts and involved actors from 80
countries, United Nations agencies and 20 national and international non-govern-
mental organizations emphasized the contribution of culture (cultural industries,
material and immaterial heritage) within the policies for the sustainable develop-
ment. As such, Hangzhou Declaration has marked an important step in the advo-
cacy of UNESCO and of China for the recognition of culture in development
programs and the inclusion of culture in the post-2015 United Nations Develop-
ment Agenda. Although China does not have equal resources with United States,
its strategy within UNESCO came to ﬁll the economic and institutional gap created
by the putting on hold of the US contribution to UNESCO, following the majority
vote on making Palestine a full Member of the organization in 2011.14 It’s worth
noting that in June 2012, in collaboration with the Group of 77, China organized a
Round Table entitled ‘What Future and What Challenges for UNESCO?’ The orga-
nizers have stressed that ‘today, UNESCO lives a serious moral crisis, whose ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculties are mere symptoms of the growing decline of our Organization.
The UNESCO of the twenty-ﬁrst century needs to be rebuilt’.15
China vis-à-vis the global cultural competition
However, China is not still regarded as a global, or even regional cultural power, with
capacities to change profoundly the balance of power within the global audiovisual
economy. The trade balance of the US audiovisual industry has long been positive,
although the United States has traditionally recorded a trade deﬁcit. Since 1980s,
Hollywood has been one of America’s largest net exporting industries and in 2012,
the surplus in audiovisual sector reached US$ 13.5 billion (Table 2), more than the
trade surplus in telecommunication, management/consulting, legal services, medical
sector or computer services (United States International Trade Commission 2014).
Table 2. Audiovisual services: US cross-border trade in audiovisual services resulted in a
US trade surplus each year during 2008 (in US$ billion).
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Exports 13.2 13.7 13.6 14.5 16.2
Imports 1.7 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.6
Trade balance 11.4 11.8 12.0 12.5 13.5


























Inspired by the world system theory of the French historian Fernand Braudel,
Charles-Albert Michalet pointed out that since 1980s, Hollywood has developed
the strategy of cinema-world based on three mechanisms: a world movie, both
movie event and global ﬁlm; a global approach on the market; horizontal coopera-
tion among companies centred on entertainment activities. ‘The cinema-world
reﬂects the economic forces that showed up the global capitalism, namely an eco-
nomic system that can only be operating in a global dimension’ (Michalet 1987,
p. 112). Enjoying main technological developments, the Hollywood ﬁlm also
remains a key product for the main media platforms (DVD, TV and Internet). In
addition, the US audiovisual services exports reached US$ 13.5 billion in 2010,
whereas those from China totalled only US$ 123 million (WTO 2012). The most
remarkable point is that while many US industries have to face trade competition
from their international counterparts, Hollywood has no real international competi-
tor. Therefore, even if the ﬁnancial and regulatory measures for the ﬁlm industry
seek to maintain and to promote a national cinematography such as in France, in
South Korea, or even in China (OEA 1998–2013),16 they fail to challenge the dom-
inance of Hollywood in terms of attraction capacity and worldwide distribution
(Crane 2013, Vlassis 2015).
It’s revealing that during the period 2008–2013, the 15 highest ﬁlm successes,
distributed by Hollywood studios, represent about a third of annual worldwide cin-
ema revenues: in 2013, they accumulate about 32% of revenue in the global ﬁlm
market, 34% in 2012, 30.5% in 2010 and 30% in 2008. An additional important
point is that on the one hand in 2013, the 15 highest movie successes, distributed by
Hollywood, recorded more than half of their revenues in the cinema markets outside
the United States and Canada and on the other hand, during the period 2007–2014,
24 Hollywood blockbusters recorded more than 74% of their total box ofﬁce
revenues in the ‘international’ markets (Table 3). As we can see, all these statistics
reveal the expertise and the ﬁnancing and marketing capabilities of Hollywood in
terms of worldwide ﬁlm distribution. Despite their competition with each other, the
Hollywood studios are usually connected by a common ﬁlm language and a strong
strategic interdependence (Trumbour 2008, Augros and Kitsopanidou 2009).
Most interesting perhaps is that only 18 non-Hollywood movie productions are
part of the list of the all-time worldwide box-ofﬁce grosses including 586 ﬁlms:
European blockbusters: Taken 1 and 2, Lucy, Resident Evil, The Fifth Element;
European comedy movies: Four weddings and a funeral, Intouchables, Bean, The
Full Monty, Bienvenue chez les ch’tis; Oscar winning movies: The King’s Speech,
Slumdog Millionaire, La Vittà è bella; Japanese animation movies: Spirited away,
Howl’s Moving Castle and Ponyo, as well as the Chinese production Crouching
Tiger Hidden Dragon (Tables 4 and 5). Among these movies, only seven are non-
Anglophone movies, 13 are British, French, or German productions and only one
is a Chinese production.17
To this should be added that over the last twenty-ﬁve years and with certain
minor movie exceptions, such as Lucy, Taken I and II, Slumdog Millionaire, The
King’s Speech, Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon – that recorded important
box-ofﬁce revenue in the US market (over US$ 100 million) – the market share of
non-US movie productions is extremely low, going from 2 to 9%. In this regard,
the ‘cinema-world’ contributes to increase the imbalance within the global
audiovisual economy and to establish the Hollywood dominance in two directions:
on the one hand, it is used for limiting the access of foreign movies – which do

























not enjoy the necessary ﬁnancial and marketing resources such as Hollywood
studios – to the US market based on an exclusive deregulation; on the other hand,
following the same logic, it grants the advantage to Hollywood movies within the
‘international markets’, serving to a progressive coordination of national markets
and to a convergence of the audience’s preferences (Scott 2004, Laroche and Bohas
2005, Miller et al. 2005, Vlassis 2015).
Moreover, since the multilateral negotiations on the GATS (General Agreement
on Trade in Services-WTO) and the debate on exception culturelle (cultural excep-
tion), the opening of ﬁlm markets and the elimination of regulatory and ﬁnancial
measures in the audiovisual sector also has been a major priority of the US trade
diplomacy. ‘The US motivation was obvious: replacing national societies of culture
with a global society of alleged efﬁciency’ (Miller and Yùdice 2002, p. 174).
In March 2013, 34 WTO members, including China, have agreed to make com-
mitments in the audiovisual services sector. Note that 18 governments of 134
founding members of the WTO took commitments in 1995, whereas during the per-
iod from 1996 to 2013, 16 governments of the 25 new WTO members18 agreed to
be subject to certain restrictions in the audiovisual sector. This reveals not only the
US pressures in favour of the liberalization of the audiovisual sector, but also the
fact that a government negotiates its accession to the WTO without being able to
build coalitions. ‘All these countries need the ticket of accession, and this ticket is
very high here’.19 As such, ‘in the WTO, on the one hand, the position of US
Table 3. Hollywood blockbusters and the percentage of their total box-ofﬁce revenues
within the ‘international markets’ (outside the US and Canada), 2007–2014.
Film
% of its global
revenues within the
‘international markets’
Gulliver’s Travel (2010) 82.0
Ice Age: Continental Drift (2012) 81.6
The Golden Compass (2007) 81.2
The Smurfs 2 (2013) 79.6
Life of Pi (2012) 79.5
The Adventures of Tintin (2011) 79.3
Battleship (2012) 78.4
2012 (2009) 78.4
A Good Day to Die Hard (2013) 77.9
Ice Age: Dawn of the Dinosaurs (2009) 77.8
Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014) 77.4
Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides (2011) 76.9
Mamma Mia (2008) 76.4
RoboCop (2014) 75.9
The Tourist (2010) 75.7
American Reunion (2012) 75.7
Hansel and Gretel: Witch Hunters (2013) 75.4
Paciﬁc Rim (2013) 75.2
After Earth (2013) 75.2
Kung Fu Panda 2 (2011) 75.2
Chronicles of Narnia: The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (2010) 74.9
The Strumfs (2011) 74.7
The Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon Emperor (2008) 74.4



























administration (regarding the audiovisual services) is positive and offensive, while
the position of European Union is negative and defensive (…) when you negotiate
your accession within the WTO, you should please everyone’ and especially the
most inﬂuential and powerful countries.20
Following the exhaustion of the WTO negotiation model (Petiteville 2013), the
US administration recently promotes a multilateralism à la carte,21 that offers more
Table 5. All-time worldwide box-ofﬁce grosses, Top-18 non-Hollywood productions.
Film Worldwide revenues (in US$ million)
Lucy (2014) 458.8
Intouchables (2011) 426.5
The King’s Speech (2010) 414.9
Slumdog Millionaire (2008) 377.9
Taken 2 (2012) 376.1
Resident Evil: Afterlife (2010) 296.2
Spirited Away (2001) 274.9
The Fifth Element (1997) 263.9
The Full Monty (1997) 257.9
Bean (1997) 251.2
Four weddings and a Funeral (1994) 245.7
Bienvenue chez les Ch’tis (2008) 245.1
Resident Evil: Retribution (2012) 240.1
Howl’s Moving Castle (2004) 235.1
La Vittà è bella (1998) 229.2
Taken (2009) 226.8
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) 213.5
Ponyo (2009) 201.8
Source: Mojo.






The Avengers (2012) 1518.6
Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows Part 2 (2011) 1341.5
Frozen (2013) 1267.8
Iron Man 3 (2013) 1215.4
Transformers: Dark of the Moon (2011) 1123.8
The Lord of the Rings: the Return of the King (2003) 1119.9
Skyfall (2012) 1108.6
Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014) 1084.4
The Dark Knight Rises (2012) 1084.4
Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s Chest (2006) 1066.2
Toy Story 3 (2010) 1063.2
Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides (2011) 1045.7
Jurassic Park (1993) 1029.2
Star Wars: Episode I-The Phantom Menace (1999) 1027.0
Alice in Wonderland (2010) 1025.5
The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012) 1017.0
Source: Mojo.

























autonomy and ﬂexibility to negotiators and it could go much further in respect of
content and trade disciplines (Deblock 2010, Gagné 2011). In the context of recent
trade negotiations – such as the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership negotiations, including 12
countries such as US, Canada, Japan, Mexico and Australia, and the negotiations
on the TISA, which currently includes 23 economies,22 being part of the WTO
informal group ‘Really good friends of Services’ – one of the major goals of the
Obama Administration and of the MPAA is the inclusion of the digital cultural ser-
vices such as video on demand or catch-up television within the agenda of negotia-
tions. All this means that governments are supposed to maintain their regulatory
and ﬁnancial capabilities in the sector of conventional cultural services (ﬁlm the-
atres, video-DVD, conventional TV), but they would be deprived of their ability to
implement new policy mechanisms for the digital services, which represent the
future of the cultural sector (Vlassis and Richieri-Hanania 2014, Vlassis 2014b).23
It’s worth noting that China wants to join the TISA negotiations in order to develop
a more dynamic and efﬁcient services domestic sector and to not isolate itself from
the recent evolutions in international trade. The US administration, however, is very
reluctant, requiring from China to make further domestic reforms within the ser-
vices sector, including the cultural services.24
Likewise, another stumbling block between China and US administration
remains the piracy and counterfeiting of cultural products.25 Despite the recent
reforms (Dimitrov 2009), for a 10th consecutive year, China is still part of the
Priority Watch List of the Special Report 301, prepared by the USTR (United
States Trade Representative) in collaboration with several private sector coalitions,
such as the MPAA or International Intellectual Property Alliance.26
Finally, at the regional level, China is also faced with many Asian countries
with substantial cultural and symbolic resources. South Korea has a very dynamic
ﬁlm sector and a thriving music industry (K-pop) and the country has also made
important investments in new technologies (Courmont and Kim 2013). Manga com-
ics, animation movies, such as Princess Mononoke (1997), Spirited away (2001),
Howl’s Moving Castle (2004) and Ponyo (2009), and karaoke – Japanese form of
entertainment – are global symbols related to the Japanese culture. In addition,
India remains the world’s largest producer of ﬁlms in the world and movie exporter
in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Conclusion
This article has offered a ﬁrst investigation into the importance of the cultural
industries for the rising powers and the role of the latters within the global gover-
nance of culture. The preceding overview reveals two main points: on the one
hand, China, absorbed into the spectacular domestic transformation of its ﬁlm
industry, has a minor impact within the world circulation of audiovisual goods and
services; on the other hand, China complies with the institutional architecture of
the global governance of cultural industries and it prefers the role of ‘follower’ (Le
Prestre 2005, p. 99), recognizing a certain connivance with the European Union
and Canada about the importance of cultural policies at the international level and
avoiding confrontation with the US administration. Hence, even if the Chinese for-
eign action about cultural industries is increasingly dynamic, its political inﬂuence



























Further, understanding Hollywood and US administration’s strategies is essential
for assessing whether China could play a crucial role within the global governance
of cultural industries. Hollywood, exerting technical and ideological inﬂuence, still
has unequalled expertise, global distribution strategies, as well as unique capacity
of innovation and funding. To this can be added that the US foreign trade policy is
a substantial diplomatic tool in order to promote the conquest of new audiovisual
markets, including China, and to strengthen the comparative advantage of the US
in the new information and communication technologies (Vlassis 2015).
Laurent Creton has pointed out that in many countries, Hollywood is not cur-
rently regarded as a national cinematography but as the cinema (Creton 1997,
p. 106); it must be kept in mind that Hollywood productions are still the only glo-
bal cultural symbols and represent the United States as the core of globalization
and as a new globalizing civilization (Kurth 2010, p. 64). Ultimately, the history of
international relations reveals that the power of countries seeking a greater role
within the international affairs is not only based on military and economic
resources, but also on symbols that capture the collective imaginaire. While China
is the current centre of gravity within the world economy, it still has a long way to
go in order to play an inﬂuential role in the international battle of cultural symbols
and to shape the distribution of norms and resources within the global governance
of cultural industries.
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Notes
1. According to the United Nations Creative Economy Report, world trade of cultural
goods and services totalled a record of US$ 624 billion in 2011 and more than doubled
from 2002 to 2011 (UNESCO-United Nations Development Program 2013).
2. About a critical analysis on the concept of soft power, see (Bohas 2006, Chavagneux
2010, pp. 26–29).
3. The ubiquity and the omnipresence of screen in our daily lives (écranocratie)
(Lipovetsky and Serroy 2007).
4. According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, feature ﬁlms are one of the most
popular cultural expressions worldwide, with an audience of approximately 7.5 billion
people per year.
5. The Chinese term for movies.
6. When the Hollywood movies box ofﬁce threatens to exceed the revenues of the
Chinese movies, the Chinese authorities decide to establish a ‘total black-out’; it means
that all the foreign ﬁlms are banned from the movie theatres. These periods are called
‘periods for the domestic movie protection’ (Martel 2011, p. 256).
7. I refer to the highest awards of the international festivals, such as Golden Palm
(Cannes), Golden Lion (Venice), Golden Bear (Berlin), Golden Leopard (Locarno),
Golden Shell (San Sebastian) and the Grand Prix of the festival juries. More
speciﬁcally, from 1988 to 2014, Chinese ﬁlms won three major awards at the Cannes
Festival, eight awards at the Berlin Festival, three at the Venice Festival, four at the
Locarno Festival, and one at San Sebastian Film Festival (see also Balme 2013).

























8. In 2006, Washington initiated the current US strategy of using the judicial forum of
the WTO to manage bilateral trade frictions with China (Bown 2009).
9. Instead, China still emphasizes a strict censorship that imposes substantial barriers for
protecting not only the audience from the foreign political and cultural inﬂuence, but
also the Chinese market. Several elements are thus supposed to be subject to censor-
ship: distorting Chinese civilization and history; disparaging the image of the people’s
army, public security organ or judiciary; showing obscene and vulgar content; showing
contents of murder, violence, terror; advertising religious extremism; showing excessive
drinking, smoking and other bad habits, etc. There are no ofﬁcial statistics for the total
number of censored movies per year, but it’s worth mentioning that in 2012, during
the ﬁfth edition of the European ﬁlm Festival organized by the European Union in
China, 15 out of 27 movies were rejected by the SARFT.
10. Other foreign movies, whose the number is annually changing, are bought by China
Film Group with ﬁxed-price contracts (ﬂat-fee ﬁlms). To these quotas a condition
about the movie exhibition is added: the relation between Chinese and foreign movies
should not be less than 2/3 of screen time for Chinese movies and 1/3 for foreign
movies, regardless the type of remuneration (revenue-sharing or ﬂat fee ﬁlms). Note
that since 1999, the quotas have not applied to co-productions; the number of the lat-
ters has been increased from 10 in 2001 to 67 in 2012. On the one hand, the co-pro-
ductions have become a major tool for the Chinese authorities in order to attract
investors and to control the content of the movies. On the other hand, they are a sig-
niﬁcant instrument for foreign producers and distributors to penetrate the Chinese ﬁlm
market, while also complying with the Chinese censorship policy. For instance, since
2011, in collaboration with the Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA), the
SARFT has organized the ‘China Co-Production Film Screenings’ in Los Angeles.
11. ‘China to build world’s most expensive ﬁlm studio’, The Guardian, 23 September
2013.
12. Instigated by Canada in June 1998, the International Network on Cultural Policy
(INCP) was an informal, international venue where national ministers responsible for
culture explored and exchanged on new and emerging policy and developed strategies
to promote cultural diversity. The last meeting of the INCP took place in 2007.
13. Interview with a high-ranking ofﬁcial at the UNESCO, 15 May 2014.
14. On 8 November 2013, the US lost its voting rights within UNESCO. The US adminis-
tration has not contributed to the UNESCO budget in 2011, 2012 and 2013, following
the US legislation adopted in the early 1990s. The latter prohibits any funding for a
UN agency that admits groups and organizations without all the internationally recog-
nized characteristics of a State. The UNESCO budget rises to US$ 507 million in
2014, which means a reduction of US$ 146 million compared to the initial budget.
15. Group of 77 and China, UNESCO-Paris, Available from: http://www.g77.org/paris/doc
uments/TEXT%20English.pdf.
16. Peter S. Grant and Chris Wood distinguish between positive and negative quotas. Posi-
tive quotas aim to ‘give to the audiences a large choice of audiovisual products, with-
out prohibiting access to a speciﬁc kind of product’. The European Union ‘Television
without Frontiers’ Directive is thus an example of positive quota in the sense that its
provisions are inclusive and non-exclusive. Quite the contrary, negative quotas seek to
‘prevent access to a diverse cultural expression’. As the authors point out, ‘Chinese
regulations restricting the import of foreign ﬁlms to 20 is an example of negative
quota. It excludes foreign cultural products much more than is necessary to make room
for local cultural expression’ (Grant and Wood 2004, pp. 288–289). For a diametrically
opposite approach, see the article of Shalia Sakona (2013), who compares the Chinese
regulations with the EU Television without Frontiers Directive. She argues that ‘for-
eign barriers to audiovisual trade, like those posed by Television Without Frontiers and
China’s current ﬁlm distribution framework, threaten the continued success of Holly-
wood (…) the United States should take a uniformly aggressive stance against foreign
barriers to audiovisual trade to protect Hollywood’s interests abroad’.
17. Source: Mojo, Available from: http://boxofﬁcemojo.com/alltime/world/.
18. Armenia, Cape Verde, China, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Panama, Russia,


























19. Interview with a high-ranking ofﬁcial at the WTO, 11 April 2014.
20. Interview with a high-ranking ofﬁcial at the WTO, 9 April 2014.
21. It is necessary to distinguish the multilateralism à la carte from other closed concepts,
like regionalism, bilateralism, or plurilateralism. Unlike regionalism, the multilateralism
à la carte, such as the recent negotiations on the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)
or the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, is not limited to a geographical area and
it is not based on the geographical proximity. Moreover, it is not necessarily result in
the establishment of institutional mechanisms, such as the case of Mercosur (institu-
tional multilateralism). Unlike the bilateralism, it includes more than two participants.
Finally, I prefer the concept of multilateralism à la carte to plurilateralism, because it
makes more explicit the eclectic character of the US strategy.
22. Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa-Rica, European Union, Hong-Kong, Island,
Israel, Japan, Mexico, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey.
23. Mid-June 2014, the Coalition of Services Industries (Team TiSA) was established in
order to represent the interests of the American service economy. The Coalition seeks
to exert political pressure on governments and to inﬂuence the agenda of current trade
negotiations on the TISA. Among the members, it’s worth mentioning Google, MPAA,
The Walt Disney Company, Microsoft, twenty-ﬁrst Century Fox, HP, Intel. ‘US Indus-
try Groups Launch “Team Tisa” To Promote Plurilateral Services Talks’, Inside US
Trade, 19 June 2014.
24. Interview with a high-ranking ofﬁcial at the WTO, 9 April 2014.
25. In April 2007, the United States initiated a complementary dispute within the WTO
over the Beijing’s failure to enforce American intellectual property rights protection. In
January 2009, the WTO issued the report of a panel that had examined the United
States’ complaint. The Panel recommended that China should bring the Copyright Law
and the Customs measures into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS agree-
ment (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). Available from: http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm.
26. The Special 301 Report is prepared annually by the Ofﬁce of the United States Trade
(USTR) under Section 301. The report identiﬁes trade barriers to US companies and
products due to the intellectual property laws. It seeks to identify countries which do
not provide ‘adequate and effective’ protection on intellectual property rights and ‘fair
and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual prop-
erty rights’. Available from: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/
2014/April/USTR-Releases-Annual-Special-301-Report-on-Intellectual-Property-Rights.
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